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DETECTION OF DECEPTION TECHNIQUE
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE
FRED E. INBAUt
As the result of an agreement and stipulation entered into be-
tween prosecution and defense counsel in a Wisconsin case, State v.
Loniello and Grignano, Judge Clayton F. Van Pelt of the Circuit
Court of Columbia County recently admitted in evidence so-called
"lie-detector" records together with expert testimony concerning their
interpretation. The instrument which was used in making the tests
upon the defendants is known as the Keeler Polygraph,1 and the
witness who conducted the examinations and who explained the
records and his interpretation thereof to the jury was Professor
Leonardo Keeler of the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of
Northwestern University School of Law.
This case represents, to the writer's knowledge, the first time in
which a court of law has permitted the use of such evidence for the
consideration of a jury.2  Upon several occasions, however, results
of this nature had been utilized by judges in civil and minor crim-
inal cases.
3
At the time when the Polygraph tests were made upon the de-
tInstructor of Police Science, Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, North-
western University School of Law. Raymond Fellow in Criminal Law, North-
western University School of Law (1932-1933).
'For detailed description of this instrument see Keeler, L., "A Method for
Detecting Deception," 1 Am. J. Police Sci. 38 (1930) ; and Inbau, F., "The
'Lie-Detector,'" 40 Scientific Monthly 81 (1935).
2Since then, on May 18, 1935, a Chicago physician was permitted to testify,
and without any stipulation to that effect, before a jury in a civil case as to
deception tests conducted by him upon his client, the defendant in a personal
injury damage suit. According to the physician's testimony, his client was not
guilty of the alleged acts, but the jury rendered a verdict to the contrary.
Reuter v. Hillberg, tried in the Circuit Court of Cook County, before Judge
John W. Preihs.
3In 1924 one of W. IL Marston's assistants testified in two Indiana cases,
involving assault and battery, before an Indianapolis city court judge as to the
results of deception tests conducted in open court upon three defendants. A
Tycos sphygmomanometer was the instrument used for this purpose, and the
tests were made on each individual as he testified from the witness stand.
According to a personal communication from, Mr. Marston, the trial judge's
findings accorded with those expressed by the examiner.
Members of the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory staff have been
called upon by trial judges in several cases, to conduct Polygraph examinations,
the results of which were used in arriving at a decision. See report of one
such case in 1 Am. J. Police Sci. 381 (1930).
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fendants, Cecil Loniello and Tony Grignano, they were awaiting trial
on a charge of assault with intent to murder. Some of the circum-
stances surrounding the crime in question tended to show that the two
defendants were among a party of four individuals at the time when
one of their number shot and seriously wounded a sheriff who was
attempting to frustrate their escape from the scene of a robbery which
the group had committed in a neighboring county. Practically all
the state's evidence was of a circumstantial nature. The principal
defense consisted of an alibi.
The probative value of all the evidence did not indicate with
any degree of predictible certainty whether or not a conviction or
acquittal would result. This state of mutual uncertainty seems to
have been the impelling motive for so strange and novel an agree-
ment as that entered into between prosecution and defense counsel.
The text of this stipulation, dated February 1, 1935, and signed by
the parties mentioned therein, is as follows:
"It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the State of Wis-
consin, by Arno Miller, District Attorney and H. B. R6gers, Special Prose-
cutor, and the defendants, Tony Grignano and Cecil Loniello, and Darrell
MacIntyre and Gordon Dawson, their attorneys:
"1. That the state shall procure and pay for the services of Mr.
Leonarde Keeler to administer the polygraph tests to each of the above
named parties, with respect to the charges now pending against them in
the Circuit Court for Green Lake County.
"2. That the State of Wisconsin and each of the defendants hereby
waive any objection which they might have to the admissibility in evidence
of the results of such tests and the methods used in the administering of
such tests and the experience with respect thereto.
"3. That the evidence so taken may be used by either party to be
considered by the jury, together with all the evidence in the case against
each of such defendants upon the trial of the charges against each of
them.
"4. That the State shall pay the witness fees for the attendance of
Mr. Leonarde Keeler at the trial upon the request of either party.
"5. That in addition to the graphs showing the results of such tests,
it is expressly agreed that said Leonarde Keeler may testify as an ex-
pert as to the conclusions reached by him in the interpretation of such
graphs."
The following day, February 2nd, each defendant was given a
series of Polygraph tests. The results, as interpreted by the examiner,
indicated not only a general consciousness of guilt, and deception to
pertinent questions of a general nature, but also, to some extent, the



























particular part played by each defendant in the commission of the
crime. The latter statement may seem somewhat paradoxical and
cannot be fully appreciated without referring to the accompanying
photographs. The Polygrams marked "A" on Plates I and II con-
tain the respiratory, pulse wave, and blood pressure responses to
various questions pertaining to the shooting and to the robbery. That
portion of each record up to the point marked "x" indicates the sub-
ject's "normal," during which time no questions were asked. At
that point the subject was directed to answer all questions by either
Cyes" or "no," reserving any explanatory remarks until completion
of the test. (Previously, of course, he had been informed of the
object and nature of the examination.) On "A" of Plate I, the only
pertinent question was asked at (4) ; (1), (2), (3), and (5) indicate
stimulus points of irrelevant question, e. g., Is your name -?, Do
you live in Madison?, Did you have some breakfast this morning?,
etc., which were asked for the purpose of further ascertaining the
subject's "norm." Similarly on "A" of Plate II, (4) and (6) are
points of stimulus with relevant questions; all others being of an
irrelevant nature.
The Polygrams marked "B" and "C" contain the responses given
during what might be termed "name tests," when an attempt was
made to ascertain which of ten suspects, including the defendants,
drove the automobile and which one shot the sheriff. For the pur-
pose of such an examination, a list containing the names of these
individuals, all known to each defendant and some of whom were
also alleged to be implicated in the crime, was exhibited to the sub-
jects and at points numbered from one to ten those names were
mentioned in the question "Did - drive the automobile ?" or "Did
- shoot the sheriff ?" "B" on both plates contains the responses
to the name test as regards the driving of the automobile, while "C"
concerned the shooting of the sheriff.
By referring to the explanations appearing under each plate,
the reader will observe that in Loniello's name test "B" (of Plate I)
(pertaining to the driving of the automobile) the greatest change
or deviation from his "normal" occurs at (8), where he reaches his
"peak of tension" in blood pressure-due doubtless to the anticipa-
tion of being asked the question to which he expected to lie-and at
which point there occurs a distinct and definite change in his respira-
tory curve. At (8) Loniello was asked whether Grignano drove the
automobile; at (5) whether he, Loniello, drove the automobile, where
no change occurred, relatively speaking. From this response at (8)
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it was inferred that Grignano drove the automobile. On "C" of
Plate I appears Loniello's responses to the name test questions per-
taining to the shooting. This time his greatest deviations occur at
(5).-"Did you, Loniello, shoot the sheriff ?"-from which fact it was
inferred that Loniello shot the sheriff.4
The foregoing deductions seem to be borne out by the duplica-
tion of these responses in Grignano's name test records, "B" and
"C" of Plate II. In "B" Grignano responds to his own name (8)
as the driver of the car, and on "C," particularly in the respiratory
curve, to Loniello's name (5) as the gunman.
At the trial of the defendants, on February 7th, Judge. Van Pelt
permitted Mr. Keeler to display to the jury the records pictured on
Plates I and II, and also to explain his interpretation, outlined above.
Then, for the benefit of the jury and in order to elicit the witness'
opinion as to the significance which he thought they should attach
to the Polygrams and his interpretation thereof, Judge Van Pelt
propounded the following question which resulted in the dialogue
quoted below:
Judge Van Pelt: Would you act upon the results of these tests alone,
if they related to the most important affairs of
human life?
Mr. Keeler: I don't know just how to answer that question.
Judge Van Pelt: I will state it this way. You have a result in this
case, haven't you?
Mr. Keeler: Yes.
Judge Van Pelt: And that result is based upon your detector?
Mr. Keeler: Yes.
Judge Van Pelt: And your experience with the detector?
Mr. Keeler: Yes.
Judge Van Pelt: You have made as a result definite findings?
Mr. Keeler: Yes.
Judge Van Pelt: And would you giVe those definite findings the
standing and the weight to decide the most im-
portant affairs of your life?
Mr. Keeler: I wouldn't want to convict a man on the grounds of
the records alone. Does that answer the question?
Judge Van Pelt: I think it does. You consider the result, then, an
element in the case?
4Previously it was supposed by the police that another suspect had shot the
sheriff.
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Mr. Keeler: True.
Judge Van Pelt: To be considered with the other circumstances and
facts in the case?
Mr. Keeler: That is right; we do.
The idea expressed in the foregoing opinion found further em-
phasis in the remarks made by Judge Van Pelt in his charge to the
jury:
"Previous to this trial, each defendant submitted himself to examina-
tion by the Keeler Polygraph. This examination was conducted by Leon-
arde Keeler, at Portage, Wisconsin, by a proper stipulation between the
State and the defendants, and Mr. Keeler was permitted to tell you the
results of the examination in question. This testimony does not tend to
show or prove any element of the crime charged. It at most and best only
tends to show that at the time of the examination of the defendants they
were not telling the truth. Now, Members of the Jury, it is for you to
give it such corroboratory weight and effect as you think it fairly and
reasonably entitled to receive."
The jury found both defendants guilty of assault regardless of
human life, in a manner evincing a depraved mind, without any pre-
meditated design to effect death. 5 Loniello received a sentence of
from one to eight years in the penitentiary, and Grignano one to six.
No appeal was taken by either defendant.
Although for many purposes a conviction is tantamount to un-
questioned proof of the commission of a crime, the writer realizes
the limitations of that principle when applied to the present case.
Standing alone, and for the purpose of scientific evaluation, the con-
viction does not absolutely verify Professor Keeler's interpretation
of the defendant's Polygrams-especially in view of the fact that
the same interpretation constituted part of the evidence utilized by
the jury in arriving at a verdict. Nevertheless, even though con-
sidered in light of this limitation, the Polygrams pictured on Plates
I and II, as well as the others obtained but not shown herein,
6 offer
valuable material for analysis.
5After the verdict had been received, the Court interrogated the jury as to
whether or not the Polygrams as explained by Professor Keeler were of any
assistance to them, and if so to what extent. This interrogatory was put to
each juror and the response from each was identically the same, viz., that the
Polygrams and the testimony were of considerable help to them in determining
the credibility of not only the defendants thepnselves, but also of the other wit-
nesses for the state who contradicted much of the testimony given by the defend-
ants. According to Judge Van Pelt, who informed the writer of the jury's
reaction as outlined herein, the jury was of "an exceptionally fine and high type.
Among them were two school teachers, and several small business men and
farmers-a real cross section of American life."
eFive others of Loniello's Polygrams, and seven more of Grignano's.
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In each set of Polygrams may be found a combination and variety
of symptomatic changes not ordinarily present in any one individual's
Polygrams. For instance, observe Loniello's response to question 5
on "C," consisting of respiratory suppression, sudden increase in
blood pressure, and very apparent change in pulse frequency. Also
observe ihe marked difference between that response and the one at
8 on "B." To the trained examiner, however, both are equally in-
dicative of deception. Then, in Grignano's Polygrams can be seen
one of his characteristic responses in the nature of a delayed decrease
in blood pressure rather than an immediate increase after untruthful
answers; his respiratory responses, however, are quite similar to
Loniello's, though not so accentuated. To the untrained individual
these variations, as well as the responses themselves, may appear
quite confusing, but to the experienced examiner, who is in a posi-
tion to evaluate them on the basis of numerous previous case his-
tories, they are highly significant.7
These two sets of Polygraph records illustrate quite clearly the
principle that this method is nothing more nor less than a technique
-a diagnostic method-for detecting deception.8  Moreover, they
should present, by their obvious complexity, ample proof of the utter
folly of an untrained individual considering himself qualified to de-
tect deception merely because he has available an apparatus for re-
cording one or more of these physiological changes. The word "un-
trained" is here used in a restrictive sense, and by it is meant untrained
in methods of detecting deception. Whatever other qualifications an
individual may possess, and regardless of their nature, it is essential
for him to acquire specific training in the technique, either by years
of experimentation and study, if working alone and unassisted, or by
an extended period of instruction under a qualified examiner, and
this too, followed by further experimentation and study.
Just as an aftermath to any new development, incompetent and
unscrupulous individuals will appear upon the scene with their "lie-
detectors." Already several such persons have made known their
presence. They have become possessed of instruments recording, in
some shape or form, one or more physiological phenomena, and after
acquiring a little skill in the mechanical operation they attempt to
?The term "previous case histories' is here used to include experimental
cases conducted under controlled conditions, and also actual cases involving the
examination of individuals suspected of crimes ranging from homicide to petty
larceny, in which the Polygraph examinations were followed by such convincing,
substantiating evidence as to leave little or no doubt as to the accuracy of the
examiner's interpretation.
8See Keeler, L., "Debunking the 'Lie-Detector,'" 25 J. Crim. Law 153 (1934).
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hold themselves out as "experts." If given the opportunity they will
"interpret their results" as best suitable for the particular occasion.
Because of this objectionable feature, if for no other reason, it is
perhaps highly desirable for courts of law to defer complete judicial
recognition of this technique for some time to come, and to restrict its
court application to cases such as the present one, in which the stipu-
lation prerequisite will serve as a safeguard and as a deterrent to
unethical practices of incompetent examiners. A lawyer, whose
client's interests are at stake will in all probability thoroughly investi-
gate the character and qualifications of an examiner before entering
into any agreement with opposing counsel to permit him to conduct
a deception test and to testify as to his results. This same privilege
and opportunity would not be accorded the trial judge who may be
confronted with the problem of passing upon the qualifications of
such a witness-in the event judicial precedent permitted him to
admit testimony of this nature in the absence of a stipulation or
agreement.
Every day more genuine interest is being aroused, and more
experimentation and investigation is being conducted in the field of
detecting deception by conscientious, honest, and otherwise generally
qualified individuals. Eventually a sufficient number of them, prac-
ticing this art with caution and in a truly scientific spirit, will justify
its universal application. In due course of time, after the technique
"has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs,"9 the judiciai-y will absorb it just as it has accepted othier sci-
entific developments- but not without the same degree of caution.1"
9See Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013, 1014, 34 A. L. R. 145, 146
(D. C., 1923).
1oFor a discussion of Frye v. United States, supra note 9, and State v.
Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933), in which cases the admissibility of
"lie-detector" testimony was denied, see Inbau, F., "Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases: 11 Methods of Detecting Deception," 24 J. Crim. Law 1140 at
pp. 1148-1150. In the Bohner case the defendant had not submitted to any
deception test and merely offered, in support of his testimony, to submit to such
an examination, which offer was refused by the trial court. As to the effect of
the constitutional safeguard against self-incrimination upon "lie-detector" evi-
denice, see ibid. at pp. 1150-1153.
